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                                          Appellant  
_____________ 
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for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. No. 2-16-cr-00073-001) 
District Judge:  Hon. Esther Salas 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 26, 2018 
 
Before:   JORDAN, BIBAS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 






JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
A jury convicted Arnaldo Echevarria of various crimes he committed during his 
employment with the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency 
                                              
 ∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
(“ICE”).  Echevarria appeals his sentence, arguing that the District Court erred when 
calculating his offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) 
because it declined to grant him a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility 
under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a).  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
Echevarria served as a deportation officer with ICE.  In February 2016, the 
government filed a nine-count indictment against him in the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey alleging that, from 2011 to 2014, he abused his position by 
agreeing to receive and receiving bribes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(b)(2) and 2, 
harboring an alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) and (B)(ii), and making 
false statements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.  The indictment specifically alleged 
that Echevarria had accepted bribes from undocumented immigrants in exchange for 
work permits that allowed them to remain in the United States, had falsified the 
immigration status of some immigrants, and had operated a business with and attempted 
to shield from ICE detection an undocumented immigrant with whom he was 
romantically involved.   
Echevarria pled not guilty and exercised his constitutional right to proceed to trial.  
At trial, he argued that the government lacked credible evidence that he had committed 
the alleged crimes.  During cross-examination, Echevarria attacked the accuracy and 
credibility of the government’s witnesses, and in closing arguments, asked the jury to 
reject their testimony and to conclude that the government had failed to meet its burden 
of proof.   
3 
After a seven-day trial, the jury convicted Echevarria on eight of the nine counts.  
During his presentence interview, Echevarria maintained his innocence, and the 
Probation Office circulated a draft Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) that 
concluded an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1 was not 
appropriate.  After receiving the draft PSR, defense counsel advised the Probation Office 
that Echevarria had accepted the jury’s verdict and had accepted responsibility for his 
actions.  Echevarria thus objected to the PSR’s denial of a three-level reduction in his 
offense level calculation under § 3E1.1.  The government opposed that objection.   In the 
final PSR, the Probation Office adhered to its initial conclusion that a § 3E1.1 reduction 
was inapplicable, and, based on an offense level of 28, it calculated a recommended 
sentence of 78 to 97 months of imprisonment.     
At sentencing, when pressed on the legal basis for his objection, given that he had 
gone to trial and was convicted, Echevarria conceded that the government had not moved 
for a one-level reduction under § 3E1.1(b) and that at most, he could seek a two-level 
reduction under § 3E1.1(a).  He further agreed with the Court’s view that the objection 
was more appropriately characterized as a request for a “variance” rather than “an actual 
application of acceptance of responsibility” under § 3E1.1.  (App. at 17.)  He argued that 
he had requested a meeting with the government after trial, during which he admitted to 
committing the crimes of conviction, and had waived his right to appeal the verdict 
against him.3     
                                              
3 At sentencing, the government confirmed meeting with Echevarria and also 
suggested that the Court could take his post-trial acceptance of responsibility into account 
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The Court overruled Echevarria’s § 3E1.1 objection, but it considered the 
evidence of his post-trial acceptance of responsibility as a mitigating factor when 
determining his sentence.  The Court expressly credited Echevarria’s meeting with the 
government during which he “spoke to them candidly about [his] conduct,” as well as his 
statements at sentencing expressing remorse, and concluded that he “should receive some 
credit for” those actions.  (App. at 50.)  It therefore put aside its initial inclination to 
impose a sentence at “the top of the range,” (App. at 49) and instead imposed a lower 
sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment.  Echeviarra now appeals.   
II. DISCUSSION4 
 
On appeal, Echevarria raises a single challenge to his sentence.  He argues that the 
District Court committed clear error by finding that he was not entitled to a two-level 
reduction for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1(a).   
Section 3E1.1 provides that a district court may grant a two-level reduction in the 
offense level “[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his 
offense,” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), and the defendant bears the burden to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that such a reduction is appropriate.  United States v. 
                                                                                                                                                  
when considering the traditional sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  But it 
maintained that his was not the “rare” case that qualified for a post-trial acceptance of 
responsibility reduction under § 3E1.1(a).  (App. at 19.) 
 
4 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  “We review factual findings 
underlying the denial of a Sentencing Guidelines reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility for clear error, and reverse only if we are left with a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 
199 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 193 (3d Cir. 2002).  The guideline commentary expressly provides 
that “[t]his adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to 
its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, 
and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse.”  U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. 2.5  Indeed, it 
is “rare” that a defendant who proceeded to trial warrants an acceptance-of-responsibility 
reduction, see id. (noting that, “[i]n rare situations,” the guideline may apply to a 
defendant who exercises his right to trial, for example, to assert and preserve a legal 
issue, such as a constitutional challenge to a statute, unrelated to factual guilt), and in 
those cases, the commentary instructs that a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility 
“will be based primarily upon pre-trial statements and conduct.”  Id.  Moreover, 
Echevarria acknowledges, as he must, that “[t]he sentencing judge is in a unique position 
to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility,” and thus, her determination “is 
entitled to great deference on review.”  (Opening Br. at 6 n.2); see also United States v. 
Dullum, 560 F.3d 133, 142 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. 5).   
We perceive no error in the District Court’s conclusion that this is not one of the 
“rare instances” in which a post-trial acceptance of responsibility reduction would be 
appropriate.  (App. at 20.)  The Court found that Echevarria “asserted his innocence all 
throughout” trial, (App. at 20), and that he continued to maintain his innocence through 
his post-trial interview with the Probation Office.  Thus, having put the government to its 
burden at trial, Echevarria falls squarely within the § 3E1.1 commentary, foreclosing 
                                              
5 “We are bound by ‘Guidelines commentary interpreting or explaining the 
application of a guideline.’”  United States v. Carter, 834 F.3d 259, 262 n.4 (3d Cir. 
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1124 (2017) (editorial marks and citation omitted).   
6 
eligibility for the offense-level reduction.  U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) cmt. 2; see also, e.g., 
United States v. DeLeon-Rodriguez, 70 F.3d 764, 767-68 (3d Cir. 1995) (affirming denial 
of § 3E1.1(a) reduction where the defendant contested his factual guilt at trial by testing 




For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the sentence. 
